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Indi a n Oc ea n
A B D AL L A H  C H A N F I  AH M E D
The post-independence period from 1976 to 1985
was witness to a great number of young Comorian
students heading for the Arab world, particularly to
Medina, to receive the necessary training to become
the future ulema of the Comoros Islands. Their return
home began to have an impact even during their
summer vacation, a time during which the d acw a
(mission) could be spread and during which they,
having studied in different countries, manifested dif-
fering influences.
Dac wa in the
Comoros Islands
The Comorians had the tendency to distin-
guish between those studying in Medina,
having the reputation of being the least
evolved of all, and those studying in other
cities in Saudi Arabia or in Kuwait, consid-
ered to be the 'evolved youth'. The latter
were said to be comparable in intellectual
terms as well as in their mentality to those
who came from France and those educated
in the lyces franais of the country. Indeed,
those not coming from Medina emphasized
their difference by dressing in the latest Eu-
ropean fashion and bringing with them the
latest modern gadgets: radio-cassette
recorders, hi-fi stereo systems, cameras, and
the like. Their mannerisms starkly contrast-
ed them with their Medinian counterparts:
the Wahhabis. The latter wore sombre
clothing consisting of a white robe and
skullcap. They stayed in their villages to
carry out preparatory work, first amongst
their families, for their definitive return. The
'apprentice cleric' defined himself as an ad-
versary of traditions and he expressed this
within, among others, his female family
members by attempting to impose the veil
and preventing them from frequenting men
outside of the family. Furthermore, he tried
to put an end to the marabout practices,
which his family may have resorted to in the
case of need.
His intervention would then be carried
out at the village level: the mosque, the
cole franaise, and the public square. At the
mosque, he would ask the village c-a l i m, who
generally administers religious instruction
between the m ag
.
r i b and a l -ci ÿs -a prayers, to
accept being replaced by him during the
school vacation. The same went for instruc-
tion, such as the t a fsøõ ra l - q ur c -a n, which takes
place at the mosque during the Ramadan.
As with every period of school vacation, the
local students organize a special course at
the cole franaise, where the young Wah-
habi would propose to administer Arabic
courses. In the public squares, he would set
up debates on a topic relating to local reli-
gious practice. During the month of the
Prophet's birth, the m a u l i d month for Co-
morians, he would seize the occasion to
preach. In this sense his preaching indicates
a capacity to adapt his strategy to the reality
of the country: although the Wahhabi ideol-
ogy condemns the practice of the m a u l i d,
young Wahhabis were happy to participate
in it with the intention of taking advantage
of the podium offered them to propagate
their message. The same holds true for the
d -ayira ceremonies or for the religious cere-
monies of the grand marriages (locally
called (m a d j l i s) .
The Wahhabis thus challenged local prac-
tices, customs, and institutions judged as
contrary to pure, original Islam. However,
these reformist claims of the Wahhabis in
the villages strongly contrasted their ab-
sence on the national scene. Their silence at
the level of the state is especially remark-
able in a country that calls itself an 'Islamic
Republic'. The entire field of contestation of
the political regime was occupied by the
Marxists of the ASEC and the groups ema-
nating from it, such as the Front Dmocra-
tique. But as the Wahhabis were home on
vacation, it was not reasonable to risk im-
prisonment or being stopped from return-
ing to Medina. It was thus necessary to keep
a low profile. This, however, would no
longer be the case after 1985.
The d acw a after the Wahhabis
definitive return home
From 1985 on, when some of the Wah-
habis completed their studies and returned
home, they began to attack the regime, crit-
icizing the Ð by now Ð Islamic Republic for
not applying the s h a ri -õ ca. In their point of
view, the term Islamic Republic was
pompous and had, for those who had in-
vented it, but two objectives: to legitimize
their policies by means of Islam, and to at-
tract financial aid from the oil-rich monar-
chies. Indeed, this intention cannot be ex-
cluded considering the volume of aid that
Abdallah's regime received from these
countries. For example, the total amount of
aid he received from the Gulf monarchies
amounted to 93.2 million dollars in 1981
and did not cease to increase until at least
1986. Apart from a few infrastructure pro-
jects such as expanding the port of Mut-
samudu, the money mostly landed in the
pockets of the government officials. Fur-
thermore, the Wahhabis' accusation
launched against the government was con-
firmed and rejoined the comical public criti-
cism that called the republic, instead of a
'Rpublique Fderal' (Federal Republic), a
'Rpublique fdarile' (feda rile: literally,
money, let's guzzle it).
This description of the way Wahhabis
spread and are still spreading their propa-
ganda brings at least three permanent fac-
tors to the fore:
The nostalgic desire to perform their
d acw a as the Prophet Himself did. First, they
tried to impose their doctrine within their
families: the Prophet did so for Islam first
with his clan. Then, they spread to the vil-
lage level: the Prophet had done so for
Mecca. Finally, they spread their message to
the national level: here again, the Prophet
had done the same after his immigration to
Medina. In all of these steps, there would
certainly be obstacles that the Wahhabi d -ac-õ
would face with respect to the means de-
manded by the state of the power struggle:
persuasion or physical confrontation. All
would depend on the opportunity present-
ed. Even this was inspired by the Prophet.
The origin myths, the obsession with the
founding act, and the supposedly perfect
paradigmatic model which must be repro-
duced, are common to all proselytizing doc-
trines that promise adepts the 'great eve'.
This dream feeds their desire to re-institute
in the here and now the prophetic State of
Medina, the ideal City.
The second permanent factor is the de-
nunciation the Wahhabis perform at the
place of the elder ulema. This is done de-
spite the fact that most of the latter were
teachers who, in the m a d r a s s a s they had
founded, gave these Wahhabis a solid basis
in the Arabic language and a modern reli-
gious education Ð in comparison with that
which they themselves had received from
their own predecessors. They had sought
out scholarships for these young Wahhabis
and organized their departures for the Is-
lamic centres in the Arab world. Today they
consider their former students ungrateful.
The third permanent factor is the fascina-
tion, with all the envy and rejection the term
implies, that the Arabophones or a r a b i s a n t s
hold for the Francophones or f r a n c i s a n t s.
The latter alone monopolize the state appa-
ratus carrying the name cole franaise, con-
sidered to be the sole legitimate education-
al institution. Yet, (as the Arabophones just-
ly hold) the state belongs to all citizens and
not merely to one caste. And while the
ulema that had founded the m a d r a s s as
were attracted and recruited to the political
parties of the period ranging from internal
autonomy to independence, and while the
new Arabophones (other than the Wah-
habis) believe themselves to be obliged to
borrow the mannerisms of the new genera-
tion of the 'Jules Ferry school', the young
Comorian Wahhabis distance themselves
from such attitudes. They want to mark their
difference in every way. Nonetheless, in
many ways, they resemble the youth of the
Marxist ASEC-FD. The former oppose their
elder ulema, the latter contest their elders in
power and the political establishment. All
are against French imperialism. The Wah-
habis are against French imperialism based
on the ideology of the Muslim Brothers
which combats the g
.
a z w i l - f i k røõ ( c o l o n i a l i z a-
tion of the spirit of Muslims by that of West-
erners, especially through their schools).
The youth of the ASEC-FD do the same, but
based on Marxist ideology which is anti-
colonialist, being understood that the impe-
rialism, for this Marxist ideology, is the
'supreme phase of capitalism'. Both move-
ments were to invent a 'counter-culture': on
the one hand, the 'new culture' (msomo wa
n y u m e n i) of the ASEC-FD, which is a mixture
of anti-conformist behaviour slightly hippy-
like and a revolutionary Marxist militantism;
and on the other hand, the Wahhabi puri-
tanism of the 'Medinians'. It seems that the
Wahhabis have imitated the young Marxists
of the ASEC-FD in their propaganda and in
their mode of organization: firstly, by their
seasonal propaganda during the school va-
cation and then by their transformation into
a political party. They generated the FNJ
(Front National pour la Justice, National
Front for Justice) in the same way that the
ASEC produced its 'Front', that being the FD
(Front Dmocratique, Democratic Front).
However, in their criticism of the magico-
customary traditions (mila na ntsi ugangi)
such as the grand marriage, they are much
closer to revolutionary Ali Soilih than the
youth of the ASEC-FD, which consider this
domain as secondary. For the latter, it was
necessary to defeat French imperialism as
well as its 'Comorian servants', meaning the
elders of the political establishment, to in-
stall a 'true democracy' (demokrasi mpiya) .
The greatest difference that separated the
youth of the ASEC-FD and the Wahhabis is
an attitude of political culture. The Wahhabis
are, just as their elder ulema and the politi-
cians that evolved from internal autonomy
to independence, much closer to the 'oral
political culture' than the 'written political
culture'. When it comes to expressing a polit-
ical opinion, they often use verbal means
(preaching at the mosque or on the national
radio) rather than written means. But the
youth of the ASEC-FD are the genuine pro-
moters in the country of a 'graphic political
culture' as witnessed in their journals such
as: U s o n i (Up Front), U s h e (The Twilight), and
D a r b i n i (Microscope). They came to master
the art of tract making. The famous 'Voice of
the People' (sauti ya umati) that so annoyed
the Abdallah regime is one illustration of
this. That did not, however, stop them from
joining the written political culture with the
oral, particularly in their records and tapes of
folklore music and revolutionary songs. An-
other difference, and not the least impor-
tant, that distinguishes them is their athe-
ism, they so like to show, and their preaching
thereof to those younger than themselves,
the members of the ASEC-FD were in a way
deicidal, which is contrary to the Wahhabis.
However, the militants of the two move-
ments are both parricidal and liberticidal.
Parricidal, because the members of both
movements aspired to taking the place of
their elders, the traditional ulema for the
Wahhabis, and the politicians for the mem-
bers of the ASEC-FD. Liberticidal, because
both movements aspired to the power and
installing a supposedly salvational dictator-
ship: the dictatorship of the proletariat for
the ASEC-FD and the dictatorship of the
s h a r iøõca for the Wahhabis. But the inaugura-
tion of the 'Shariatocracy' is not possible in a
'deus ex machina'. For that, a political com-
bat in the framework of new democratic era
must be lead.  u
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